The Planning Inspectorate

Appeal Decision

Inquiry opened on 19 April 2017

Site visit made on 20 April 2017

by Philip Major BA(Hons) DipTP MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Decision date: 26 June 2017

Appeal Ref: APP/R3650/A/13/2206225
Land adjacent to 1 East View Cottages, Dunsfold Road, Alfold GU6 8JB.

- The appeal is made under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against a refusal to grant planning permission.
- The appeal is made by Mr Mark Wenman against the decision of Waverley Borough Council.
- The application Ref: WA/2013/0923, dated 3 September 2012, was refused by notice dated 2 August 2013.
- The development proposed is the use of land for the stationing of caravans for residential purposes for 1 no. gypsy pitch together with the formation of additional hard standing and utility/dayroom ancillary to that use.
- This decision supersedes that issued on 30 October 2014. That decision on the appeal was quashed by order of the High Court.

Decision

1. The appeal is allowed and planning permission is granted for 1 no. gypsy pitch together with the formation of additional hard standing and utility/dayroom ancillary to that use at land adjacent to 1 East View Cottages, Dunsfold Road, Alfold GU6 8JB in accordance with the terms of the application, Ref: WA/2013/0923, dated 3 September 2012, subject to the conditions set out in the schedule at the end of this decision.

Preliminary Matters

2. As noted above this decision supersedes the S78 appeal decision issued in October 2014 which was quashed by order of the High Court. However, that 2014 decision sat alongside a second decision made in the same document on a linked enforcement appeal[1] which was not subject to High Court proceedings. The enforcement decision therefore stands, and the period for compliance (18 months) has now expired. Because the S78 decision has been quashed I must determine the appeal afresh. My decision is therefore based on the evidence presented to me but so far as the quashed decision is relied upon by the parties I accept those matters as being material considerations. The enforcement decision is also a material consideration.

3. Since the close of the inquiry the parties have been given the opportunity to comment on the judgement handed down by the Supreme Court which deals with the interpretation of paragraph 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) and the application of the 'tilted' balance of paragraph 14 of

[1] APP/R3650/C/13/2208831

the NPPF[2]. The judgement makes clear that it is not necessary to be legalistic in the categorisation of policies for the supply of housing (or otherwise). Of more importance is whether policies are achieving a 5 year supply of housing. As such, although there was evidence given on whether policies in this case fall within the definition of 'policies for the supply of housing' I do not consider it necessary to make a judgement on that in respect of the relevant policies.

4. Since the previous inquiry the parties have produced a statement of common ground (SoCG) signed and dated 19 April 2017 which narrows the issues between them. In particular there is now no dispute that the Appellant enjoys gypsy status as defined in the glossary to Planning Policy for Traveller Sites (PPTS) of August 2015. Having heard from the Appellant at the inquiry I have no reason to disagree with that position. It is also agreed that no infrastructure contributions would be required in the event of the appeal being successful. For these reasons the Council no longer contests reasons for refusal 2 and 3.

5. It is acknowledged by the Council that there is a general unmet need for gypsy and traveller sites within the area of the Borough Council. The quantum of current need is not agreed, being estimated by the Council at 11 pitches, and at 102 pitches by the Appellant. Evidence was submitted to indicate how those figures had been reached, and in the case of the Appellant this includes a critique of the Council's calculation. However, it is agreed that the Council cannot demonstrate a 5 year supply of deliverable sites, and as indicated in PPTS this is a significant material consideration in any decision which considers the grant of temporary planning permission. The lack of sites is also a material consideration generally. It is further agreed that there are no suitable, acceptable and affordable sites available to the Appellant.

6. At the time of my site visit the appeal site contained a mobile home, a small summer house and some other garden items. The majority of the land has been gravelled or paved, and the boundaries are fenced within the perimeter hedging which already exists.

Main Issues

7. In light of the narrowing of matters between the parties the main issues in the appeal can now be defined as:

   (a) The effect of the development on the character and appearance of the surrounding area;

   (b) The need for sites, the needs of the Appellant and his family, and the availability of alternative sites;

   (c) Human Rights and the Public Sector Equality Duty;

   (d) The overall planning balance.

Policy Background

8. PPTS seeks, amongst other things, to promote more private traveller sites and increase the number of sites in appropriate locations whilst paying due regard to the protection of local amenity and the local environment.

9. The development plan includes the Waverley Borough Local Plan of 2002 (LP). A number of policies are agreed as being of relevance in relation to the

[2] *Suffolk Coastal District Council v Hopkins Homes Ltd and SSCLG, Richborough Estates Partnership LLP and SSCLG v Cheshire East Borough Council [2017] UKSC*.

remaining reason for refusal. These are Policies C2, D1, D4 and H11. However, there is some disagreement about their consistency with the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). The Council argues that in apportioning weight to policies regard should be had to the core principles of the NPPF, as set out in paragraph 17. Paragraph 215, though, seems to me to require a judgement on weight to follow an assessment of consistency with the policies in the NPPF (paragraphs 18 – 219) and not the core principles. That said, it would clearly be wrong to ignore the core principles as these are the precursor to the NPPF policies themselves. The core principles are a material consideration.

10. Policy C2 seeks to protect countryside for its own sake and to strictly control building away from settlements. This policy has been found in other cases to lack consistency with the NPPF in view of the fact that protection of the countryside for its own sake does not feature as a policy within the NPPF. Rather the NPPF requires valued and designated landscapes to receive high levels of protection and enhancement. Elsewhere it is expected that recognition of the intrinsic character and beauty of the countryside will be taken into account, as set out in the core principles of the NPPF which precede the policies. As such I agree with findings elsewhere that Policy C2 has the bar for countryside protection raised too high in relation to the NPPF. The policy can therefore carry only limited weight.

11. Policy D1 deals with the environmental implications of development by reference to a number of criteria. It is a policy framed in restrictive terms such that material detriment as set out in the criteria would preclude development. Although in some respects there is a judgement to be struck when considering proposals under Policy D1 it seems to me to be more prescriptive than the inherent balance required when considering proposals in NPPF terms. The policy therefore lacks some consistency with the NPPF and attracts only moderate weight.

12. Policy D4 deals with design and layout. The overall objective, set out in the policy, is to ensure that development is of a high quality design which integrates with the site and complements the surroundings. The more detailed criteria following that overarching objective give some indication of how the policy would be implemented. It seems to me that this is a policy which for the most part requires judgements to be made and a balance to be struck. As such it is not greatly different in approach to the NPPF albeit that some of its criteria are more prescriptive. I afford the policy moderate to significant weight.

13. Policy H11 deals specifically with gypsy sites. It is a restrictive policy unless there is compliance with other development plan policies and subject to 2 criteria. These criteria relate to the stationing of caravans being at an appropriate scale of provision, and that adequate services are available on site. Neither criterion is in play as the Council accepts that the proposal meets them if other factors are satisfactory. However the Appellant suggests that the policy is out of date by extension because the other policies to which it refers are out of date by virtue of being inconsistent with the NPPF. In relation to Policy D4 I do not completely agree as set out above, but in overall terms it is my judgement that H11 is out of date since it would not be possible to comply with it as other policies on which it relies are not consistent with the NPPF. In this I agree with the Appellant that it should carry limited weight.

14. The *Wenman*[3] High Court judgement which resulted in the quashing of the previous S78 appeal decision relating to this site found that whether or not the Council could demonstrate a 5 year supply of deliverable housing sites was a matter which applicants may wish to rely on in gypsy cases since the provision of residential caravans is housing. The subsequent Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) of July 2015 made a technical adjustment to the NPPF in which it was indicated that *"…those persons who fall within the definition of "traveller" under the PPTS, cannot rely on the lack of a five year supply of deliverable housing sites under the NPPF to show that relevant policies for the supply of housing are not up to date. Such persons should have the lack of a five year supply of deliverable traveller sites considered in accordance with PPTS."* As noted in other decisions this means that the lack of a 5 year supply of gypsy and traveller sites does not render housing supply policies out of date (or not up to date) as set out in NPPF paragraph 49. The Appellant sought leave to challenge the WMS but that was refused as being out of time. He alleges that it is discriminatory because (in simple terms) an application for a traveller site made by a person other than a traveller (such as a landowner or council) would not be caught by the provisions of the WMS, but an application made by a gypsy or traveller would. I deal with that point later in this decision.

15. As matters stand, however, the WMS is a material consideration to which I must have regard. The Appellant falls within the definition of a traveller and the WMS therefore indicates that housing supply policies should not be considered to be out of date albeit that there is an agreed lack of a 5 year supply of traveller sites. This seems to me to be moot point because I have found that the relevant policy relating to the provision of traveller sites (H11) is out of date. Hence it is appropriate in any event to invoke paragraph 14 of the NPPF.

16. Reference was made at the inquiry to the emerging local plan. It was agreed that any policies which might have relevance to this appeal can be afforded limited weight in view of the stage of preparation of the plan and the unresolved objections to the plan, notably the disputed level of need for gypsy and traveller sites. The emerging plan policies referred to therefore play no determinative role in this appeal.

Reasons

Character and appearance

17. The appeal site is on the edge of the settlement of Alfold and immediately adjacent to a row of houses. It is agreed that it is in the countryside. The Council argue that it is in open countryside and away from the settlement and therefore the development falls within the ambit of paragraph 25 of PPTS which indicates that such development should be very strictly controlled. I do not agree with the Council's approach. As a matter of agreed fact that site is within 5 or 10 metres of the settlement boundary at most. It is also a small site largely enclosed by native hedgerows. If the Council's position was correct it would mean that traveller sites would, to all intents and purposes, be required to be within settlements. The fact that PPTS specifically uses the phrase "…open countryside that is away from existing settlements…" plainly means that sites in countryside which is not away from settlements can be acceptable. It does not refer to sites being required to be within or even

[3] *Wenman v SSCLG [2013] EWHC 925 Admin*

attached to settlements. Although in the countryside I do not judge this site to be open countryside in the sense that it has limited views out and limited views in and across it. It is more akin to being a semi-rural small enclosure on the edge of the village and not away from it.

18. I also differ from the Council on whether or not gypsy and traveller sites in the countryside are acceptable in principle. Given that PPTS specifically seeks to limit such sites which are in open countryside and away from existing settlements, it cannot be a realistic position to take to suggest that sites in the countryside which are not judged to be "away from a settlement" are not acceptable in principle. Clearly any such site would require assessment and judgement on impacts to be made, but I see nothing to suggest that, subject to those judgements falling favourably, a gypsy site in the countryside cannot be acceptable in principle.

19. In this case the site would be well related to the settlement. The surroundings are of mixed agricultural character with fields generally delineated by hedgerows, and with some significant blocks of woodland. I agree with the Appellant that it is not a landscape which could reasonably attract the title of being valued in the terms set out in the NPPF. It has been accepted in case law that such a description correctly applies to landscapes which, although undesignated in a formal sense, have some definable quality which set them apart from the ordinary[4]. In this locality the landscape is pleasant and typical of the general area, but unremarkable in itself. As a result of the clarity introduced by case law I can safely identify this as differing circumstances to the still extant enforcement appeal decision relied upon (at least in part) by the Council in which the previous Inspector found this to be a valued landscape in NPPF terms.

20. Although it cannot be properly regarded as valued in policy terms I agree that the site lies within an area of transition between the settlement and the open countryside, and note the scattered development beyond the site and further into the countryside. I also agree that it is important that development in such areas is strictly controlled. It may well be the case that small changes can have significant impact, but in this case the change is largely hidden from view.

21. I was struck by the fact that the site only registers as being occupied when closely approached. There is little from either north or south to point to the fact that there is a mobile home on site, beyond the occasional glimpse of the light coloured cladding of that structure. The situation has moved on from the position when the proposal was first considered at appeal, and I do not agree that the juxtaposition of the mobile home and adjacent dwelling is such that there is material harm to the visual amenity of the area. It remains clear on close inspection that the form of development on the appeal site is different to the pitched roof dwellings adjacent and to the south, but the lack of opportunity to see both in the same view other than in fleeting and close glimpses means that the relationship is not unduly incongruous.

22. The previous Inspector was concerned that the surrounding hedgerows would need to be cut back, but I saw at my site visit that these still provide good screening and filtering of views into the site. In midwinter the screening impact would be reduced, but the fencing to the rear of the hedgerows is in itself effective as a mitigating factor. The development is of a small scale and has only a slight impact on the surroundings. I cannot agree that in its current

[4] For example *Stroud District Council v SSCLG and Gladman Developments Ltd [2015] EWHC 488 (Admin)*

form it is highly visible. Overall I find that there would be limited harm to the character of the area, which in general would remain almost unchanged, and limited harm to the visual qualities of the locality because the development would be restrained and seen only at close quarters (even allowing for the construction of a dayroom and stationing of a touring caravan).

23. It is important to indicate at this point that I have given full consideration to the concerns expressed by neighbours. But it seems to me that the development has limited impact given the detailed situation which exists between the nearest dwelling and the appeal site. Principal elevations of the adjacent dwelling do not face onto the site and there is little of the development to be seen above the fence on the common boundary. Whilst the use of land for residential purposes adjacent would be a change to the situation currently enjoyed by the occupants of that dwelling, the change would not be such as to materially impair their enjoyment of the dwelling or render it an unsuitable place to live. I could see no evidence that there would be any overlooking of the adjacent property or loss of privacy for neighbouring residents. The development would not dominate the settled community.

24. On this issue I find that the proposal would have limited detriment to the character and appearance of the area in which it is located. Nonetheless it would be in conflict with LP Policy C2 since it does not fall into any category of development defined as acceptable by that policy, but as noted above that policy attracts limited weight in any case. I do not find that there would be significant conflict with Policy D1 as there would be limited detrimental impact on the environment, but the policy carries only moderate weight in any event. I cannot conclude that the proposal complements the surroundings, and hence there is some conflict with Policy D4. But the conflict is not significant given the scale, form and appearance of the development. This development plan conflict is considered further in the planning balance.

The need for sites, needs of the Appellant, and alternatives

25. It does not seem to me to matter much whether the current unmet need for sites is 11 pitches or 102 pitches. The Council has acknowledged that the 2014 Gypsy and Traveller Accommodation Assessment (GTAA) underestimates need, and it has amended its position (to the accepted need for 11 sites) pending a new assessment which is currently underway. The Appellant's figures rely on a number of assumptions and although they have not been the subject of a critique by the Council, nor have they been tested in any other way. As such I do not regard them as necessarily wholly reliable. In truth the real figure of need may well lie between the positions of the parties, but in any case can only be regarded as significant. This general need for sites therefore attracts significant weight.

26. It is clear that the need for sites is not new and the Appellant has suggested that there is a failure of policy in the Borough. Clearly there has been failure to work from a robust evidence base as witnessed by the acceptance that the 2014 GTAA was flawed. In this respect the Council's current position is in conflict with the advice of PPTS which exhorts the use of an evidence base which informs the preparation of local plans and enables the making of sound planning decisions. This failure of policy adds to the weight in favour of the proposal.

27. There is no dispute that the Appellant has a need for a site. I heard suggestions that he had moved from an alternative authorised location, but

this was not confirmed. In any case the Council accepts that there are no suitable, acceptable, affordable and available sites on which the Appellant and his family could reside. Dismissal of the appeal would be likely to result in them having to resort to a roadside existence, especially so since the period for compliance with the 2013 enforcement notice has now expired.

28. The Appellant has 2 young children, the elder of whom now attends the local primary school. No party has suggested that the needs of the children are not at the forefront of this case, and it is accepted case law that their needs must be a primary consideration. It is agreed that a settled home from which to access the education, healthcare and other benefits is a very important part of the balance, which I deal with below.

Human rights and the public sector equality duty

29. Article 8[5] ECHR rights of the Appellant and his family are engaged because dismissing this appeal would lead to a loss of their home. This is not a matter specifically addressed by the Council in evidence though it was accepted in cross examination that it is in the best interests of the children (a primary consideration[6] though not necessarily determinative) to have a stable and secure home. Dismissing the appeal would amount to interference with the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. This is a qualified right which can be overridden if it is necessary and proportionate to do so. I deal with this matter in the planning balance.

30. As I note earlier, the Appellant alleges that the WMS of July 2015 leads to discrimination against travellers. As the *Wenman* judgement found that traveller site provision is housing provision it follows that an application for a traveller site not made by a traveller may continue to benefit from the enhanced weight of paragraph 14 if there is no 5 year supply of housing. The Council sought to argue that the WMS had been subjected to an equalities statement, but the statement (submitted at the inquiry) related to a consultation on proposed changes to traveller guidance which predated *Wenman* and the WMS. I cannot see how this would adequately address the point made by the Appellant and it does not seem to be dealt with terms in the equalities statement[7] or the response to consultation[8]. It is perhaps regrettable that this matter has not had an opportunity to be argued in the courts, and in my view this is not a matter best suited to seeking a definitive answer through the auspices of a S78 appeal. However, I cannot but agree with the Appellant that there appears to be an arguable case for consideration in the context of the Equality Act 2010 which requires, amongst other things, that due regard must be had to the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a protected characteristic and those who do not. Despite these arguments being put forward the very fact that the relevant policy for the provision of traveller sites in this case is out of date engages paragraph 14 of the NPPF in any event since that paragraph is not simply linked to paragraph 49. Any relevant out of date policy is capable of triggering paragraph 14.

31. The matter of the human rights of the nearest neighbours has also been raised. I understand the submissions made but do not find that permitting this

[5] Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
[6] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
[7] Consultation: planning and travellers. Equalities statement. DCLG September 2014
[8] Planning and travellers: proposed changes to planning policy and guidance. Consultation response. DCLG August 2015

proposal would interfere with those rights. There would, for example, be no removal of their home(s). The impact on their enjoyment of their homes I have dealt with above.

32. With these matters in mind I turn to the overall planning balance.

The planning balance

33. The circumstances of this appeal differ from those pertaining during the previous consideration of this proposal. In particular the interpretation of NPPF paragraph 109 relating to valued landscapes has become clearer. In addition, for the reasons explained above, my judgement on the harm caused by the development in this location differs from the previous Inspector and partially reflects changes in the intervening years. The WMS does not mean that I cannot apply the tilted balance of paragraph 14 of the NPPF in this case because Policy H11 is out of date and carries limited weight.

34. There is a modest degree of impact on the character and appearance of the area and some conflict with the development plan policies as set out above. These policies carry varying degrees of weight in the planning balance in light of the fact that they are not wholly in tune with the NPPF.

35. The acknowledged lack of sites attracts significant weight. There is an agreed failure to provide a 5 year supply and I also attach weight to the fact that this failure of policy is not new. It is an ongoing problem which is unlikely to be solved until the emerging Local Plan is adopted. It is common ground that any new sites are unlikely to be available for 4 years or more.

36. The needs of the Appellant, and more particularly his children, are of great weight and Article 8 of the ECHR is engaged. Case law has determined that the needs of the child must be a primary consideration. Although not necessarily determinative any interference with rights must be shown to be proportionate. The provision of a settled home for the Appellant and his family carries substantial weight in this case.

37. PPTS indicates that planning applications should be determined in accordance with the presumption in favour of sustainable development. In this case there would be some small scale economic benefit from spending in the local economy, but far greater social benefit from the provision of a gypsy site in general, and in meeting the needs of this family in particular. Environmental harm is limited and, taken in the round, I am satisfied that the development follows the principles of sustainable development set out in the NPPF.

38. Taking all these matters in the round it is my judgement that the limited harm to the character and appearance of the locality, and the limited conflict with the development plan, is clearly outweighed by the substantial weight of the benefits of providing a settled home for the Appellant and his family, and the significant weight attaching to the provision of a gypsy pitch in an area of proven need. There are no adverse impacts which would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits I have identified. Even were Policy H11 not deemed to be out of date it is clear that the benefits of the development significantly outweigh the limited harm, and therefore on a 'standard' S38(6) balance the scales would favour the Appellant's case. I have therefore decided that the appeal should be allowed.

39. Dismissal of the appeal would entail interference with the human rights of the Appellant's family, and there is at least the possibility of discrimination

resulting from the application of the WMS. However, because I have decided to allow the appeal it is not necessary for me to pursue this matter further.

40. I have given consideration to whether a personal or time limited permission should be granted in this case. In view of the limited harm I do not consider that either would be appropriate. The site is sufficiently well related to the settlement, is sustainable, and with appropriate conditions attached would continue to be acceptable in its long term impact. It is suitable as a permanent site, and therefore neither personal nor time limited permissions are necessary in this case.

Other Matters

41. I understand the concern expressed that granting planning permission here would be likely to result in the intensification of the use of the land, or its extension into the adjacent field. However I must deal with the matters before me only, and any future proposals are for the Council to consider in the first instance.

42. I have been made aware that previous applications for planning permission for residential development on the site have been refused. Those applications are not before me and I do not know the details of those cases. I can only deal with the matters before me on the basis of the evidence pertaining to this proposal.

43. Correspondence has suggested that there would be difficulties with highway safety at the site, and that there is inadequate infrastructure to service it. However these matters do not form part of the Council's case and I have no evidence to support those views.

Conditions

44. An agreed list of conditions was provided at the inquiry. I agree that in order to retain a satisfactory form of development it is necessary to impose conditions specifying the approved plans and requiring further agreement to detailed matters within a limited time frame. The permission should also be restricted to gypsies and travellers as defined in PPTS as the permission stems from the specific needs of that community. In addition, to protect the amenity of the area, it is necessary to specify the maximum number of caravans on site, to ensure that vehicles are restricted to a maximum size, and to restrict commercial activity on the land.

Overall Conclusion

45. For the reasons given above I conclude that the appeal should be allowed.

Philip Major

INSPECTOR

SCHEDULE OF CONDITIONS

1) The development hereby permitted shall be carried out in accordance with the following approved plans unless otherwise agreed pursuant to a condition attached to this permission:

   12_501_001; 12_501_003B; 12_501_004; 12_501_005.

2) The site shall not be occupied by any persons other than gypsies and travellers as defined in Annex 1: Glossary of Planning Policy for Traveller Sites August 2015.

3) The use hereby permitted shall cease and all caravans, structures, equipment and materials brought onto the land for the purposes of such use shall be removed within 30 days of the date of failure to meet any one of the requirements set out in i) to iv) below:

   i) Within 3 months of the date of this decision a scheme for the layout of the site, including vehicle parking and turning spaces, hard and soft landscaping and the means of foul and surface water drainage, shall have been submitted for the written approval of the local planning authority and the scheme shall include a timetable for its implementation and a schedule for the maintenance of soft landscaping.

   ii) If within 9 months of the date of this decision the local planning authority refuse to approve the scheme or fail to give a decision within the prescribed period, an appeal shall have been made to, and accepted as validly made by, the Secretary of State.

   iii) If an appeal is made in pursuance of ii) above, that appeal shall have been finally determined and the submitted scheme shall have been approved by the Secretary of State.

   iv) The approved scheme shall have been carried out and completed in accordance with the approved timetable.

   Upon implementation of the approved scheme specified in this condition, that scheme shall thereafter be retained.

   In the event of a legal challenge to this decision, or to a decision made pursuant to the procedure set out in this condition, the operation of the time limits specified in this condition will be suspended until that legal challenge has been finally determined.

4) If, within a period of 5 years from the date of planting, any planting pursuant to the scheme approved in Condition 3) (or any planted in replacement for it) is removed, uprooted, destroyed or dies or becomes seriously damaged or defective, another of the same species as that originally planted shall be planted at the same place within the first planting season following the removal, uprooting, destruction or death of the original.

5) No more than 2 caravans, as defined in the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 and the Caravan Sites Act 1968 as amended (of which no more than 1 shall be a static caravan) shall be stationed on the site at any time.

6) No vehicle over 3.5 tonnes shall be stationed, parked or stored on this site.

7) No commercial activities shall take place on the land, including the external storage of materials.

APPEARANCES

FOR THE LOCAL PLANNING AUTHORITY:

Mr J Parker of Counsel

He called

Mr J Cunnane MRTPI	Senior Partner, Cunnane Town Planning LLP

FOR THE APPELLANT:

Mr M Rudd of Counsel

He called

Mr M Wenman	The Appellant
Mr M Green	Green Planning Studio Ltd

INTERESTED PERSONS:

Mrs J Dawson	Local resident

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED AT THE INQUIRY

1 Opening statement of Mr Parker
2 Statement of Common Ground, signed and dated 19 April 2017
3 Updated witness statement of Mr Wenman
4 HC judgement in *Stroud v SSCLG and Gladman Developments Ltd*
5 HC judgement in *Forest of Dean v SSCLG and Gladman Developments Ltd*
6 HC judgement in *Cheshire East v SSCLG and Harlequin (Wistaston) Ltd*
7 Appeal decision APP/R3650/W/15/3132089
8 CoA judgement in *Collins v SSCLG*
9 Draft schedule of conditions
10 Consultation: planning and travellers. Equalities statement, September 2014
11 Planning and travellers: proposed changes to planning policy and guidance. Consultation response, August 2015
12 Closing statement of Mr Parker
13 Closing submissions of Mr Rudd